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1 Introduction
Policy responses to the 2008 crisis have resulted in a massive increase in the
liabilities of many scal and monetary authorities. In the face of stretched
public nances, the question of the coordination of scal and monetary poli-
cies has come back to the foreground of policy discussions. At the origin
of this longstanding question is the simple observation that the intertempo-
ral budget constraint of the public sector imposes a restriction on the joint
path of (nominal) public liabilities, (real) scal surpluses, and price levels.
As Sargent (1986) simply puts it: \Arithmetic makes the strategies of the
monetary and scal authorities interdependent."
Monetary economists often use a game-theoretic terminology to describe
this interdependence. This can be traced back to Wallace's view of a \game
of chicken" played among branches of government that control separate el-
ements of the budget constraint.1
Yet despite these informal references to game theory, the interaction
of scal and monetary authorities has not to our knowledge lent itself to a
thorough strategic analysis. Broadly speaking, the macroeconomic literature
has taken two routes to simplify away this interaction. A rst route consists
in summarizing the behavior of each authority with a policy rule. Monetary
and scal rules must then be consistent with equilibrium conditions including
the non-explosiveness of ination and public debt (e.g., Leeper 1991). The
second route posits that one authority has a free hand at policy making,
and so the other authority has no option but accommodating it in order to
ensure that the public sector is solvent. In the monetary regime, monetary
policy by assumption has full backing by the scal authority. In the scal
regime of Sargent and Wallace (1981), conversely, the monetary authority
sets seignorage revenues (thereby giving up control of ination) so that real
government liabilities imposed by the scal authority and primary surpluses
have the same present value. The goal of this paper is to develop a more
general and agnostic strategic analysis of this interaction.
We model Wallace's \game of chicken" as...a game between a scal and
a monetary authority. We posit that each authority controls a policy in-
1Examples abound. Recent ones include Svensson (2017): \In spite of this interaction,
normally monetary policy and scal policy are conducted separately, with each policy tak-
ing the conduct and eects of the other policy into account. This corresponds to a so-called
Nash equilibrium in game theory, where each player chooses his or her instruments inde-
pendently to achieve his or her goals, while taking into account the conduct of the policy
by the other player." See also Sims' 2013 presidential address: \(...)With recent repeated
Congressional games of chicken over the debt limit and inability to bargain to a resolution
of long-term budget problems, the answer may now be in some doubt."
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strument. The scal authority sets the real scal surplus and the mone-
tary one sets the price level at each date. Both authorities can also trade
nominal intertemporal claims|government debt and remunerated reserves,
respectively|with the private sector. Each authority incurs costs when its
respective policy instrument strays away from a target. Both also incur
costs from outright sovereign default.2
We do not oer particular micro-foundations for these costs. Our ap-
proach is instead one of \revealed preferences". We model each authority's
payo in a very exible and general fashion. We also consider several strate-
gic interactions between them (simultaneous game, bargaining) as well as
various degrees of commitment and information structures. Our goal is to
characterize the equilibria resulting from each set of assumptions on payos
and strategic interactions, and from there to back out the set of assump-
tions that delivers the most plausible empirical implications. This way we
seek insights into the question that Sargent and Wallace (1981) raise in con-
clusion of their unpleasant arithmetic: \The question is, Which authority
moves rst, the monetary authority or the scal authority? In other words,
Who imposes discipline on whom?"
Section 2 starts with a simple static version of the game that generates
two main insights.3 It rst highlights how the structure of default costs
aects the nature of the game between authorities. This game is an actual
\game of chicken" only when default costs are convex. In this case ac-
commodation by one authority makes playing tough more appealing to the
other. The xed default cost that is commonly assumed in the literature
on sovereign default introduces by contrast a coordination motive among
authorities: Accommodation by one of them may make accommodation by
the other relatively more attractive. As a result, pure-strategy equilibria
with and without default coexist in the presence of xed costs, whereas they
do not when costs are convex. Second, and more technically, we nd that
simultaneous games have unappealing properties that limit their practical
relevance. They either feature many equilibria and so lack predictive power
or, in a version with uncertainty, counterfactually predict that the public sec-
tor frequently resorts to small defaults. We conclude that sequential games
such as those implicit in the monetary and scal regimes described above
2Costs from outright default in practice include output losses due to nancial-market
exclusion, trade sanctions, banking crises and more generally nancial instability, as well
as private costs|electoral or more generally political costs for the scal authority and
career concerns for central bankers.
3The static game is essentially akin to the multi-period game of Section 3 when both
authorities can fully commit to a future action plan.
3
are more practically relevant theoretical tools. But then, selecting the most
relevant game among these requires an answer to Sargent and Wallace's
question about who moves rst.
In order to tease out more testable implications from various assumptions
regarding which authority moves rst, Section 3 then studies a multi-period
game. The version in which the scal and monetary authorities cannot com-
mit beyond their current terms is the most plausible in our view. Comparing
the situations in which the monetary authority moves rst at each period
(\monetary lead") with that of scal lead generates two main implications.
First, the scal authority can force the monetary one to depart from
its target and inate debt away even when the monetary authority moves
rst. To do so, it needs to roll over government debt until the outstanding
amount is suciently large that the monetary authority cannot impose full
scal accommodation, as the scal authority would prefer to default in this
case. In other words, the scal authority gains bargaining power through
endogenous scal irresponsibility even if the monetary one moves rst by
assumption. The monetary authority by contrast controls only whether the
public sector owes money to itself or to the private sector via open-market
operations, but cannot aect the schedule of repayments. Thus it cannot
force the government to accommodate in a symmetric way under scal lead.
Second, we make the natural assumption that the public sector incurs
immediate costs of default as soon as the path of public nances is not sus-
tainable and features default at some future date. This implies that avoiding
sovereign default seems less costly when the necessary scal and monetary
adjustments are more remote. To overcome the resulting time-consistency
issue, each authority can avail itself of a commitment device. The scal
authority simply prepays some outstanding liabilities. The monetary au-
thority expands its balance sheet by creating suciently large amounts of
reserves that serve as a commitment to inate beyond ex-post optimal levels
in the future. This owes to the key but plausible assumption that reserves
are the fundamental unit of value in the economy, and so outright default
on reserves is innitely costly and never occurs in equilibrium.
These predictions lead us to conclude that the version of the model in
which the scal authority moves rst is best suited to describe US public
nances since 2008. First, this version is the only one in which the central
bank signicantly and immediately expands its balance sheet whereas the
government postpones scal consolidation to the longer run.4 Second, this
4Hall (2013) documents a shift away from stabilizing the debt to GDP ratio with
scal policy that persists long after the post-2008 recession. Recent projections by the
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version is the only one in which ination is also postponed to the long-run.
Overall, our strategic analysis thus suggests that the answer to Sargent and
Wallace's question is: the scal authority moves rst.
Related literature
As in Aguiar et al. (2013, 2015), we study how the public sector combines
ination, taxes, and outright default in order to cope with a liability shock,
and we model the respective costs of these instruments in a reduced form.
In Aguiar et al. (2013), the public sector is comprised of one single agent
and the focus is on its optimal ination credibility in the presence of self-
justied solvency crises. Aguiar et al. (2015) formalize a monetary union
as a public sector comprised of a monetary authority and atomistic scal
authorities. Albeit in a simpler dynamic environment, we complement these
papers with the study of the case in which both components of the public
sector are comprised of strategic agents.
An older literature (Alesina 1987, Alesina and Tabellini 1987, Tabellini
1986, and more recently Dixit and Lambertini 2003) study like us Nash
equilibria between multiple branches of government. We contribute to this
literature in two ways. First, we include sovereign default as a feasible strat-
egy prole. We view this as a pre-requisite to a full-edged strategic analysis
of Sargent and Wallace's unpleasant arithmetic: One needs to specify pay-
os when the public sector defaults in order to derive scal or/and monetary
accommodation along default-free equilibrium paths. More important, we
show how the scal and monetary authorities can respectively use govern-
ment debt and excess reserves as strategic devices to regulate their future
bargaining powers in the absence of commitment.
Our point that balance-sheet expansion is a device to commit to future
price levels that the monetary authority would nd ex-post excessive but
that are ex-ante desirable echoes similar rationales for quantitative easing
in the face of a liquidity trap. In Battharai et al. (2015), the central bank
commits to low future interest rates by owning long-term bonds that would
depreciate under higher rates, thereby endangering its solvency. The depre-
ciation of foreign reserves resulting from low domestic price levels acts as
a similar threat to the solvency of the monetary authority in Jeanne and
Svensson (2007). The mechanism that generates a commitment to high fu-
ture price levels in our setup diers from these, however. By making its
net wealth highly sensitive to the government's decision to (strategically)
Congressional Budget Oce (CBO) tend to conrm this shift.
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default, the central bank deliberately eliminates its future incentives to let
the government default rather than inate debt away since such a default
would come with ination anyway.
The restrictions that central-bank \solvency" imposes on feasible price-
level paths rationalize unconventional measures in our setup. These restric-
tions are also central in the analyses of new-style central banking developed
by Hall and Reis (2015) and Reis (2015, 2017). Our strategic approach
delivers the novel insight that the swap of government debt with remuner-
ated reserves is not neutral even when both types of claims are risk free
and thus perfect substitutes in equilibrium. Such expansions of the central
bank's balance sheet increase its exposure to the out-of-equilibrium threat of
sovereign default. This reduces the future bargaining power of the monetary
authority, thereby raising future price levels.
2 Wallace's game of chicken: Which game?
2.1 Setup
We consider a static game between two players, a scal authority F and a
monetary authority M .
Actions. The scal authority F sets a real primary surplus  2 R and the
monetary authority M a price level p 2 R+. Players move simultaneously.
Payos. F and M face a maturing nominal liability b  0. A strategy
prole (; p) yields payos UX(; p) to player X 2 fF ;Mg such that
UF (; p) =  fF
 
b
p
  
+!
  gF (j   F j) ; (1)
UM (; p) =  fM
 
b
p
  
+!
  gM (jp  pM j) ; (2)
where (fX ; gX)X2fF ;Mg are increasing, strictly convex and dierentiable
functions over [0;+1), F > 0, pM > 0, and x+  1fx0gx. For con-
ciseness, we restrict the analysis to the case in which g0X spans [0;+1) for
X 2 fF ;Mg.
In words, each authority incurs additively separable costs from i) setting
its policy instrument away from a given target5, and ii) from the (real)
5The analysis carries through if M has an ination target.
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loss resulting from sovereign default (equal to 0 if the liability is honored
in full).6 We could extend our approach to the case of non-separability in
principle, presumably at the cost of additional analytical complexity. We
leave this for future research mainly because we believe that the signs of
the interaction terms would depend on the particular micro-foundations for
these payos (e.g., nature of the cost of default). Note that these separable
payos include the case in which F and M share the same objective
 f
 
b
p
  
+!
  gF (j   F j)  gM (jp  pM j) (3)
but do not cooperate to maximize it.7
These payos are such that the scal and monetary authorities have no
reason to deviate from their respective targets other than avoiding to default
on the maturing public liabilities b. This implies that there is no point for
either authority to undershoot its target as it increases the loss given default.
In game-theoretic language, F dominates any strategy   F for F , and
pM dominates any strategy p  pM for M . This implies in particular that
(F ; pM ) is the unique Nash equilibrium (and is an equilibrium in dominant
strategies) when b  F pM . The remainder of the paper focusses on the
alternative situation of interest in which b > F pM . In other words, we
study a situation in which the policy (F ; pM ) that would be optimal in
\normal times" must be revised in order to keep government debt sustainable
following a signicant shock on public liabilities, such as the one that resulted
from the 2008 crisis.
In this case, if no player accommodates by overshooting its target, then
there is outright default. The situation in which the scal authority stays
on its primary-surplus target whereas the monetary authority fully accom-
modates to avoid default, i.e., inates debt away, corresponds to what is
commonly described as the scal regime in the monetary literature, whereas
the symmetric situation corresponds to the monetary regime. In our strate-
gic formulation, each regime corresponds to a particular strategy prole:
Denition. (Fiscal and monetary regimes) The scal regime is the
strategy prole (F ; b=F ) and the monetary regime is the strategy prole
(b=pM ; pM ).
6Results are qualitatively similar if the nominal loss given default matters.
7This is because adding to UX terms that do not depend on X's instrument does not
aect its optimal decision. This is only true in this simultaneous-move version of the game
though.
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We now solve for the Nash equilibria of this game, with a particular
interest in identifying the circumstances under which either the scal regime
or the monetary regime are Nash equilibria.
2.2 Equilibria
We rst focus on equilibria in pure strategies. The functions UF (:; p) and
UM (; :) are strictly concave and bounded above and so admit each a unique
maximizer which is the best response to the other authority's policy. Strict
concavity of UF and UM also implies that these best responses are decreas-
ing in the other player's action. In other words, M and F play a \game
of chicken", whereby accommodation is a strategic substitute. More ac-
commodation by one authority makes playing tough more appealing to the
other.
Let us dene
M = sup
F
fg0F (   F )  f 0F (0)g; (4)
pF = sup
ppM
fpg0M (p  pM )  Mf 0M (0)g: (5)
The following proposition characterizes the pure-strategy equilibria of the
game:
Proposition 1. (Pure-strategy equilibria) There exists F pM < b  <
b+ < MpF such that
 If b 2 (F pM ; b ] then there exists a continuum of equilibria given
by the strategy proles (; b=) where  2 [F ; b=pM ]. Thus there is
no default in equilibrium and both the monetary and scal regimes
correspond to equilibria.
 If b 2 (b ; b+], there also exists a continuum of equilibria without de-
fault. Only one of the two regimes, either scal or monetary depending
on parameter values, is an equilibrium outcome.
 If b 2 (b+; MpF ], there also exists a continuum of equilibria without
default that include neither the scal nor the monetary regime.
 If b > MpF there exists a unique equilibrium with default such that
p;  , and the loss given default all increase with respect to b.
Proof. See the appendix. 
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⌧M
<latexit sha1_base64="3S5i4XrPO0fUQK5u/ 6PY9jRRWXg=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69BIvgqSQiqLeiFy9CBdMW2lA22227drMbdid CCf0PXjyoePUHefPfuG1z0NYHA4/3ZpiZFyWCG/S8b6ewsrq2vlHcLG1t7+zulfcPGkalmrKAKqF0 KyKGCS5ZgBwFayWakTgSrBmNbqZ+84lpw5V8wHHCwpgMJO9zStBKjQ6StHvXLVe8qjeDu0z8nFQgR 71b/ur0FE1jJpEKYkzb9xIMM6KRU8EmpU5qWELoiAxY21JJYmbCbHbtxD2xSs/tK21LojtTf09kJ DZmHEe2MyY4NIveVPzPa6fYvwwzLpMUmaTzRf1UuKjc6etuj2tGUYwtIVRze6tLh0QTijagkg3BX3 x5mQRn1auqf39eqV3naRThCI7hFHy4gBrcQh0CoPAIz/AKb45yXpx352PeWnDymUP4A+fzB9/ljtw =</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="3S5i4XrPO0fUQK5u/ 6PY9jRRWXg=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69BIvgqSQiqLeiFy9CBdMW2lA22227drMbdid CCf0PXjyoePUHefPfuG1z0NYHA4/3ZpiZFyWCG/S8b6ewsrq2vlHcLG1t7+zulfcPGkalmrKAKqF0 KyKGCS5ZgBwFayWakTgSrBmNbqZ+84lpw5V8wHHCwpgMJO9zStBKjQ6StHvXLVe8qjeDu0z8nFQgR 71b/ur0FE1jJpEKYkzb9xIMM6KRU8EmpU5qWELoiAxY21JJYmbCbHbtxD2xSs/tK21LojtTf09kJ DZmHEe2MyY4NIveVPzPa6fYvwwzLpMUmaTzRf1UuKjc6etuj2tGUYwtIVRze6tLh0QTijagkg3BX3 x5mQRn1auqf39eqV3naRThCI7hFHy4gBrcQh0CoPAIz/AKb45yXpx352PeWnDymUP4A+fzB9/ljtw =</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="3S5i4XrPO0fUQK5u/ 6PY9jRRWXg=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69BIvgqSQiqLeiFy9CBdMW2lA22227drMbdid CCf0PXjyoePUHefPfuG1z0NYHA4/3ZpiZFyWCG/S8b6ewsrq2vlHcLG1t7+zulfcPGkalmrKAKqF0 KyKGCS5ZgBwFayWakTgSrBmNbqZ+84lpw5V8wHHCwpgMJO9zStBKjQ6StHvXLVe8qjeDu0z8nFQgR 71b/ur0FE1jJpEKYkzb9xIMM6KRU8EmpU5qWELoiAxY21JJYmbCbHbtxD2xSs/tK21LojtTf09kJ DZmHEe2MyY4NIveVPzPa6fYvwwzLpMUmaTzRf1UuKjc6etuj2tGUYwtIVRze6tLh0QTijagkg3BX3 x5mQRn1auqf39eqV3naRThCI7hFHy4gBrcQh0CoPAIz/AKb45yXpx352PeWnDymUP4A+fzB9/ljtw =</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="3S5i4XrPO0fUQK5u/ 6PY9jRRWXg=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69BIvgqSQiqLeiFy9CBdMW2lA22227drMbdid CCf0PXjyoePUHefPfuG1z0NYHA4/3ZpiZFyWCG/S8b6ewsrq2vlHcLG1t7+zulfcPGkalmrKAKqF0 KyKGCS5ZgBwFayWakTgSrBmNbqZ+84lpw5V8wHHCwpgMJO9zStBKjQ6StHvXLVe8qjeDu0z8nFQgR 71b/ur0FE1jJpEKYkzb9xIMM6KRU8EmpU5qWELoiAxY21JJYmbCbHbtxD2xSs/tK21LojtTf09kJ DZmHEe2MyY4NIveVPzPa6fYvwwzLpMUmaTzRf1UuKjc6etuj2tGUYwtIVRze6tLh0QTijagkg3BX3 x5mQRn1auqf39eqV3naRThCI7hFHy4gBrcQh0CoPAIz/AKb45yXpx352PeWnDymUP4A+fzB9/ljtw =</latexit>
p
<latexit sha1_base64="sa3XKU6W0cCRxW+vAd2sBJl5xKI=">AAAB53icbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4KokI6q3oxWMLxhbaUDbbSbt2swm7G6GE/gIvHlS8+pe8 +W/ctjlo64OBx3szzMwLU8G1cd1vZ2V1bX1js7RV3t7Z3duvHBw+6CRTDH2WiES1Q6pRcIm+4UZgO1VI41BgKxzdTv3WEyrNE3lvxikGMR1IHnFGjZWaaa9SdWvuDGSZeAWpQoFGr/LV7Scsi1EaJqjWHc9NTZBTZTgTOCl3M40pZSM6wI6lksaog3x26IScWqVPokTZkobM1N8TOY21Hseh7YypGepFbyr+53UyE10FOZdpZlCy+aIoE8QkZPo1 6XOFzIixJZQpbm8lbEgVZcZmU7YheIsvLxP/vHZd85oX1fpNkUYJjuEEzsCDS6jDHTTABwYIz/AKb86j8+K8Ox/z1hWnmDmCP3A+fwBIh4zI</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="sa3XKU6W0cCRxW+vAd2sBJl5xKI=">AAAB53icbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4KokI6q3oxWMLxhbaUDbbSbt2swm7G6GE/gIvHlS8+pe8 +W/ctjlo64OBx3szzMwLU8G1cd1vZ2V1bX1js7RV3t7Z3duvHBw+6CRTDH2WiES1Q6pRcIm+4UZgO1VI41BgKxzdTv3WEyrNE3lvxikGMR1IHnFGjZWaaa9SdWvuDGSZeAWpQoFGr/LV7Scsi1EaJqjWHc9NTZBTZTgTOCl3M40pZSM6wI6lksaog3x26IScWqVPokTZkobM1N8TOY21Hseh7YypGepFbyr+53UyE10FOZdpZlCy+aIoE8QkZPo1 6XOFzIixJZQpbm8lbEgVZcZmU7YheIsvLxP/vHZd85oX1fpNkUYJjuEEzsCDS6jDHTTABwYIz/AKb86j8+K8Ox/z1hWnmDmCP3A+fwBIh4zI</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="sa3XKU6W0cCRxW+vAd2sBJl5xKI=">AAAB53icbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4KokI6q3oxWMLxhbaUDbbSbt2swm7G6GE/gIvHlS8+pe8 +W/ctjlo64OBx3szzMwLU8G1cd1vZ2V1bX1js7RV3t7Z3duvHBw+6CRTDH2WiES1Q6pRcIm+4UZgO1VI41BgKxzdTv3WEyrNE3lvxikGMR1IHnFGjZWaaa9SdWvuDGSZeAWpQoFGr/LV7Scsi1EaJqjWHc9NTZBTZTgTOCl3M40pZSM6wI6lksaog3x26IScWqVPokTZkobM1N8TOY21Hseh7YypGepFbyr+53UyE10FOZdpZlCy+aIoE8QkZPo1 6XOFzIixJZQpbm8lbEgVZcZmU7YheIsvLxP/vHZd85oX1fpNkUYJjuEEzsCDS6jDHTTABwYIz/AKb86j8+K8Ox/z1hWnmDmCP3A+fwBIh4zI</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="sa3XKU6W0cCRxW+vAd2sBJl5xKI=">AAAB53icbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4KokI6q3oxWMLxhbaUDbbSbt2swm7G6GE/gIvHlS8+pe8 +W/ctjlo64OBx3szzMwLU8G1cd1vZ2V1bX1js7RV3t7Z3duvHBw+6CRTDH2WiES1Q6pRcIm+4UZgO1VI41BgKxzdTv3WEyrNE3lvxikGMR1IHnFGjZWaaa9SdWvuDGSZeAWpQoFGr/LV7Scsi1EaJqjWHc9NTZBTZTgTOCl3M40pZSM6wI6lksaog3x26IScWqVPokTZkobM1N8TOY21Hseh7YypGepFbyr+53UyE10FOZdpZlCy+aIoE8QkZPo1 6XOFzIixJZQpbm8lbEgVZcZmU7YheIsvLxP/vHZd85oX1fpNkUYJjuEEzsCDS6jDHTTABwYIz/AKb86j8+K8Ox/z1hWnmDmCP3A+fwBIh4zI</latexit>
pM
<latexit sha1_base64="x1vYiYDQ jEwGLZTBzc3FeldGLRE=">AAAB6XicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEUG 9FL16EisYW2lA22027dLMJuxOhhP4ELx5UvPqPvPlv3LY5aPXBwOO9GWbmha kUBl33yyktLa+srpXXKxubW9s71d29B5NkmnGfJTLR7ZAaLoXiPgqUvJ1qTu NQ8lY4upr6rUeujUjUPY5THsR0oEQkGEUr3aW9m1615tbdGchf4hWkBgWave pnt5+wLOYKmaTGdDw3xSCnGgWTfFLpZoanlI3ogHcsVTTmJshnp07IkVX6J Eq0LYVkpv6cyGlszDgObWdMcWgWvan4n9fJMDoPcqHSDLli80VRJgkmZPo36 QvNGcqxJZRpYW8lbEg1ZWjTqdgQvMWX/xL/pH5R925Pa43LIo0yHMAhHIMHZ 9CAa2iCDwwG8AQv8OpI59l5c97nrSWnmNmHX3A+vgGXoY2I</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="x1vYiYDQ jEwGLZTBzc3FeldGLRE=">AAAB6XicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEUG 9FL16EisYW2lA22027dLMJuxOhhP4ELx5UvPqPvPlv3LY5aPXBwOO9GWbmha kUBl33yyktLa+srpXXKxubW9s71d29B5NkmnGfJTLR7ZAaLoXiPgqUvJ1qTu NQ8lY4upr6rUeujUjUPY5THsR0oEQkGEUr3aW9m1615tbdGchf4hWkBgWave pnt5+wLOYKmaTGdDw3xSCnGgWTfFLpZoanlI3ogHcsVTTmJshnp07IkVX6J Eq0LYVkpv6cyGlszDgObWdMcWgWvan4n9fJMDoPcqHSDLli80VRJgkmZPo36 QvNGcqxJZRpYW8lbEg1ZWjTqdgQvMWX/xL/pH5R925Pa43LIo0yHMAhHIMHZ 9CAa2iCDwwG8AQv8OpI59l5c97nrSWnmNmHX3A+vgGXoY2I</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="x1vYiYDQ jEwGLZTBzc3FeldGLRE=">AAAB6XicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEUG 9FL16EisYW2lA22027dLMJuxOhhP4ELx5UvPqPvPlv3LY5aPXBwOO9GWbmha kUBl33yyktLa+srpXXKxubW9s71d29B5NkmnGfJTLR7ZAaLoXiPgqUvJ1qTu NQ8lY4upr6rUeujUjUPY5THsR0oEQkGEUr3aW9m1615tbdGchf4hWkBgWave pnt5+wLOYKmaTGdDw3xSCnGgWTfFLpZoanlI3ogHcsVTTmJshnp07IkVX6J Eq0LYVkpv6cyGlszDgObWdMcWgWvan4n9fJMDoPcqHSDLli80VRJgkmZPo36 QvNGcqxJZRpYW8lbEg1ZWjTqdgQvMWX/xL/pH5R925Pa43LIo0yHMAhHIMHZ 9CAa2iCDwwG8AQv8OpI59l5c97nrSWnmNmHX3A+vgGXoY2I</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="x1vYiYDQ jEwGLZTBzc3FeldGLRE=">AAAB6XicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEUG 9FL16EisYW2lA22027dLMJuxOhhP4ELx5UvPqPvPlv3LY5aPXBwOO9GWbmha kUBl33yyktLa+srpXXKxubW9s71d29B5NkmnGfJTLR7ZAaLoXiPgqUvJ1qTu NQ8lY4upr6rUeujUjUPY5THsR0oEQkGEUr3aW9m1615tbdGchf4hWkBgWave pnt5+wLOYKmaTGdDw3xSCnGgWTfFLpZoanlI3ogHcsVTTmJshnp07IkVX6J Eq0LYVkpv6cyGlszDgObWdMcWgWvan4n9fJMDoPcqHSDLli80VRJgkmZPo36 QvNGcqxJZRpYW8lbEg1ZWjTqdgQvMWX/xL/pH5R925Pa43LIo0yHMAhHIMHZ 9CAa2iCDwwG8AQv8OpI59l5c97nrSWnmNmHX3A+vgGXoY2I</latexit>
pF
<latexit sha1_base64="JlVNyiaRntxv3qu4tIGPicP8X2o=">AAAB6XicbV BNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEUG9FQTxWNLbQhrLZbtqlm03YnQgl9Cd48aDi1X/kzX/jts1Bqw8GHu/NMDMvTKUw6LpfTmlpeWV1rbxe2djc2t6p7u49mCTT jPsskYluh9RwKRT3UaDk7VRzGoeSt8LR1dRvPXJtRKLucZzyIKYDJSLBKFrpLu1d96o1t+7OQP4SryA1KNDsVT+7/YRlMVfIJDWm47kpBjnVKJjkk0o3MzylbE QHvGOpojE3QT47dUKOrNInUaJtKSQz9edETmNjxnFoO2OKQ7PoTcX/vE6G0XmQC5VmyBWbL4oySTAh079JX2jOUI4toUwLeythQ6opQ5tOxYbgLb78l/gn9Yu6d 3taa1wWaZThAA7hGDw4gwbcQBN8YDCAJ3iBV0c6z86b8z5vLTnFzD78gvPxDY0MjYE=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="JlVNyiaRntxv3qu4tIGPicP8X2o=">AAAB6XicbV BNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEUG9FQTxWNLbQhrLZbtqlm03YnQgl9Cd48aDi1X/kzX/jts1Bqw8GHu/NMDMvTKUw6LpfTmlpeWV1rbxe2djc2t6p7u49mCTT jPsskYluh9RwKRT3UaDk7VRzGoeSt8LR1dRvPXJtRKLucZzyIKYDJSLBKFrpLu1d96o1t+7OQP4SryA1KNDsVT+7/YRlMVfIJDWm47kpBjnVKJjkk0o3MzylbE QHvGOpojE3QT47dUKOrNInUaJtKSQz9edETmNjxnFoO2OKQ7PoTcX/vE6G0XmQC5VmyBWbL4oySTAh079JX2jOUI4toUwLeythQ6opQ5tOxYbgLb78l/gn9Yu6d 3taa1wWaZThAA7hGDw4gwbcQBN8YDCAJ3iBV0c6z86b8z5vLTnFzD78gvPxDY0MjYE=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="JlVNyiaRntxv3qu4tIGPicP8X2o=">AAAB6XicbV BNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEUG9FQTxWNLbQhrLZbtqlm03YnQgl9Cd48aDi1X/kzX/jts1Bqw8GHu/NMDMvTKUw6LpfTmlpeWV1rbxe2djc2t6p7u49mCTT jPsskYluh9RwKRT3UaDk7VRzGoeSt8LR1dRvPXJtRKLucZzyIKYDJSLBKFrpLu1d96o1t+7OQP4SryA1KNDsVT+7/YRlMVfIJDWm47kpBjnVKJjkk0o3MzylbE QHvGOpojE3QT47dUKOrNInUaJtKSQz9edETmNjxnFoO2OKQ7PoTcX/vE6G0XmQC5VmyBWbL4oySTAh079JX2jOUI4toUwLeythQ6opQ5tOxYbgLb78l/gn9Yu6d 3taa1wWaZThAA7hGDw4gwbcQBN8YDCAJ3iBV0c6z86b8z5vLTnFzD78gvPxDY0MjYE=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="JlVNyiaRntxv3qu4tIGPicP8X2o=">AAAB6XicbV BNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEUG9FQTxWNLbQhrLZbtqlm03YnQgl9Cd48aDi1X/kzX/jts1Bqw8GHu/NMDMvTKUw6LpfTmlpeWV1rbxe2djc2t6p7u49mCTT jPsskYluh9RwKRT3UaDk7VRzGoeSt8LR1dRvPXJtRKLucZzyIKYDJSLBKFrpLu1d96o1t+7OQP4SryA1KNDsVT+7/YRlMVfIJDWm47kpBjnVKJjkk0o3MzylbE QHvGOpojE3QT47dUKOrNInUaJtKSQz9edETmNjxnFoO2OKQ7PoTcX/vE6G0XmQC5VmyBWbL4oySTAh079JX2jOUI4toUwLeythQ6opQ5tOxYbgLb78l/gn9Yu6d 3taa1wWaZThAA7hGDw4gwbcQBN8YDCAJ3iBV0c6z86b8z5vLTnFzD78gvPxDY0MjYE=</latexit>
Monetary regime
<latexit sha1_base64="U23Gr5A yx+vzshvbvOgsFYpyF/E=">AAACBHicbVC7SkNBEN3r2/iKWmqxGASrcK8 Iahe0sREUjAkkIezdTJLFfVx254rhksbGX7GxULH1I+z8GzePQhMPDBzO mWFmTpxI4TAMv4OZ2bn5hcWl5dzK6tr6Rn5z69aZ1HIocyONrcbMgRQayi hQQjWxwFQsoRLfnQ/8yj1YJ4y+wV4CDcU6WrQFZ+ilZn63jvCA2ljFZHZp NCCzPWqhIxT0m/lCWAyHoNMkGpMCGeOqmf+qtwxPFWjkkjlXi8IEGxmzK LiEfq6eOkgYv2MdqHmqmQLXyIZf9Om+V1q0bawvjXSo/p7ImHKup2LfqRh 23aQ3EP/zaim2TxqZ0EmKoPloUTuVFA0dREJbwgJH2fOEcSv8rZR3mWUc fXA5H0I0+fI0KR8WT4vR9VGhdDZOY4nskD1yQCJyTErkglyRMuHkkTyTV/ IWPAUvwXvwMWqdCcYz2+QPgs8fD0qZIQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="U23Gr5A yx+vzshvbvOgsFYpyF/E=">AAACBHicbVC7SkNBEN3r2/iKWmqxGASrcK8 Iahe0sREUjAkkIezdTJLFfVx254rhksbGX7GxULH1I+z8GzePQhMPDBzO mWFmTpxI4TAMv4OZ2bn5hcWl5dzK6tr6Rn5z69aZ1HIocyONrcbMgRQayi hQQjWxwFQsoRLfnQ/8yj1YJ4y+wV4CDcU6WrQFZ+ilZn63jvCA2ljFZHZp NCCzPWqhIxT0m/lCWAyHoNMkGpMCGeOqmf+qtwxPFWjkkjlXi8IEGxmzK LiEfq6eOkgYv2MdqHmqmQLXyIZf9Om+V1q0bawvjXSo/p7ImHKup2LfqRh 23aQ3EP/zaim2TxqZ0EmKoPloUTuVFA0dREJbwgJH2fOEcSv8rZR3mWUc fXA5H0I0+fI0KR8WT4vR9VGhdDZOY4nskD1yQCJyTErkglyRMuHkkTyTV/ IWPAUvwXvwMWqdCcYz2+QPgs8fD0qZIQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="U23Gr5A yx+vzshvbvOgsFYpyF/E=">AAACBHicbVC7SkNBEN3r2/iKWmqxGASrcK8 Iahe0sREUjAkkIezdTJLFfVx254rhksbGX7GxULH1I+z8GzePQhMPDBzO mWFmTpxI4TAMv4OZ2bn5hcWl5dzK6tr6Rn5z69aZ1HIocyONrcbMgRQayi hQQjWxwFQsoRLfnQ/8yj1YJ4y+wV4CDcU6WrQFZ+ilZn63jvCA2ljFZHZp NCCzPWqhIxT0m/lCWAyHoNMkGpMCGeOqmf+qtwxPFWjkkjlXi8IEGxmzK LiEfq6eOkgYv2MdqHmqmQLXyIZf9Om+V1q0bawvjXSo/p7ImHKup2LfqRh 23aQ3EP/zaim2TxqZ0EmKoPloUTuVFA0dREJbwgJH2fOEcSv8rZR3mWUc fXA5H0I0+fI0KR8WT4vR9VGhdDZOY4nskD1yQCJyTErkglyRMuHkkTyTV/ IWPAUvwXvwMWqdCcYz2+QPgs8fD0qZIQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="U23Gr5A yx+vzshvbvOgsFYpyF/E=">AAACBHicbVC7SkNBEN3r2/iKWmqxGASrcK8 Iahe0sREUjAkkIezdTJLFfVx254rhksbGX7GxULH1I+z8GzePQhMPDBzO mWFmTpxI4TAMv4OZ2bn5hcWl5dzK6tr6Rn5z69aZ1HIocyONrcbMgRQayi hQQjWxwFQsoRLfnQ/8yj1YJ4y+wV4CDcU6WrQFZ+ilZn63jvCA2ljFZHZp NCCzPWqhIxT0m/lCWAyHoNMkGpMCGeOqmf+qtwxPFWjkkjlXi8IEGxmzK LiEfq6eOkgYv2MdqHmqmQLXyIZf9Om+V1q0bawvjXSo/p7ImHKup2LfqRh 23aQ3EP/zaim2TxqZ0EmKoPloUTuVFA0dREJbwgJH2fOEcSv8rZR3mWUc fXA5H0I0+fI0KR8WT4vR9VGhdDZOY4nskD1yQCJyTErkglyRMuHkkTyTV/ IWPAUvwXvwMWqdCcYz2+QPgs8fD0qZIQ==</latexit>
Fiscal regime
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Figure 1. The dashed segments of hyperbolae represent the pure-strategy equilibria associated with three 
values                   such that                                                                                  . 
b1 = ⌧p
b2 = ⌧p
b3 = ⌧p
b1, b2, b3 ⌧F pM < b1 < b  < b2 < b+ < b3 < ⌧MpF
The equilibria are best described graphically in the plane (p; ). Refer
to Figure 1. If b is suciently large that the graph of the hyperbola b = p
is to the northeast of C, then there is a unique equilibrium with default.
Otherwise, the equilibria are default-free, described by the segment of the
hyperbola b = p that is within the shaded area ABCD.8 The intersection
of this segment (if any) with AB is the monetary regime whereas that with
AD (if any) corresponds to the scal regime. For suciently low levels of
debt, both the monetary and scal regimes are equilibrium outcomes. This
is illustrated by the case b = b1 in Figure 1. As b increases, one of the
two regimes ceases to be an equilibrium outcome. This is illustrated by the
case b = b2 in Figure 1 in which the monetary regime is not an equilibrium
outcome.9 Both authorities accommodate as b gets close to the value at
which they default (as in the case b = b3 in Figure 1).
Regarding the circumstances under which the scal and monetary regimes
are Nash equilibria, Proposition 1 has two unsurprising but interesting im-
plications. First, none of these regimes is an equilibrium outcome as soon
8This area collapses to A and so there is a unique equilibrium with default if f 0F (0) =
f 0M (0) = 0.
9Either regime can survive in general in this area depending on which authority has
the highest cost of default relative to deviation from target.
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as public debt is suciently large other things being equal, as both par-
ties accommodate in this case. Second, if the monetary or/and the scal
regime are rationalizable outcomes, then unfortunately they coexist with a
continuum of default-free equilibria in which both parties accommodate.
Mixed-strategy equilibria. Only pure-strategy equilibria are default-free
when b  MpF . There also exists for such values of b a large collection of
mixed-strategy equilibria that all feature stochastic default.10
The next section reduces the number of equilibria by adding the in-
gredient that both authorities have imperfect control over their respective
instruments.
2.3 Uncertainty
A simple way to reduce the number of equilibria is to introduce uncertainty
in this game. This section does so by leaving the previous model unchanged,
up to the additional assumption that F and M imperfectly control their
respective policy variables. If F seeks to set the real surplus at  , an actual
surplus eF is realized. Similarly, the realized price level is peM if M
sets a price level p. F and M set  and p simultaneously. When doing
so they share the prior belief that the random variable (F ; M ) admits a
p.d.f. 1=2'(F =; M=), where  > 0 and ' has a bounded support
11
that includes a neighborhood of (0; 0).12 F and M seek to maximize their
respective expectations over the payos dened in (1) and (2).
Proposition 2. (Uncertainty yields equilibrium uniqueness) There
exists a unique equilibrium ((); p()). If b > MpF , then lim!0((); p())
is the strategy prole of the unique equilibrium obtained in the model without
uncertainty. Otherwise, lim!0((); p()) is the unique solution to
b = p; (6)
pg0M (p  pM )f 0F (0) = g0F (   F )f 0M (0) : (7)
In this case, the probability of default is strictly positive, increasing from 0
to 1 as b spans (F pM ; MpF ]. Its limit for a given b  MpF as  ! 0 is
10It is easy to see for example that any pair of (default-free) pure-strategy equilibria
(; p) and ( 0; p0) can be associated with an equilibrium with stochastic default in which
F and M mix over the strategies associated with each equilibrium.
11This is only meant to abstract from convergence issues.
12A positive shock on output is likely both to generate a higher surplus than initially
budgeted and to create inationary pressure. A realistic assumption is thus that M and
F be positively correlated, but this plays no role in our analysis.
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g0F (   F )=f 0F (0) = pg0M (p  pM )=f 0M (0).
Proof. See the appendix. 
On the one hand, this version of the model delivers a unique equilibrium
in which both parties accommodate. On the other hand, accommodation
always comes with a strictly positive probability of sovereign default. For
a given b, the probability of default is in particular bounded away from 0
as uncertainty vanishes. The loss given default however becomes arbitrarily
small for b < MpF in this limiting case. This prediction that the public
sector uses small sovereign defaults as a routine tool whenever some accom-
modation is necessary is highly counterfactual. To be sure, the probability
of default can be made small for b xed by assuming that the marginal costs
of default f 0X(0) are suciently large other things being equal. Yet we nd
this description of the coordination of scal and monetary policies to be at
odds with the commonly held view of a pecking order, whereby sovereign
default is a last-resort strategy used only after other options have failed, at
least in developed economies.
2.4 Non-convex cost of default
We aim at modelling payos in an agnostic and exible fashion, and so we
started above with a simple convex cost of default. The sovereign-default
literature commonly assumes non-convexities, however, in the form of a xed
component to the cost of default. We introduce here such a xed cost by
assuming utilities:
UF (; p) =  F1fb>pg  j    F j; (8)
UM (; p) =  M1fb>pg  j p  pM j; (9)
where F ; M > 0.
13 The assumption of a linear dependence in j    F j
and j p  pM j is just a normalization given the xed cost of default. We let
1 = inffF (pM + M ); (F + F )pMg; (10)
2 = supfF (pM + M ); (F + F )pMg; (11)
3 = (F + F )(pM + M ); (12)
and characterize pure-strategy equilibria:
Proposition 3. (Pure-strategy equilibria with a xed default cost)
13The addition of a variable cost to the xed one assumed here does not signicantly
aect the analysis.
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 If b 2 (F pM ; 1] there exists a continuum of equilibria given by the
strategy proles (; b=) where  2 [F ; b=pM ]. Thus there is no default
in equilibrium and both the monetary and scal regime correspond to
equilibria.
 If b 2 (1; 2], there also exists a continuum of equilibria without de-
fault. The scal regime is an equilibrium but not the monetary one if
1 = (F + F )pM whereas the opposite holds otherwise.
 If b 2 (2; 3], there exists a continuum of equilibria without default
that does not include the scal nor the monetary regime. There also
exists an equilibrium in which F and M default and play their targets
(F ; pM ).
 If b > 3 then this latter equilibrium with default is the unique one.
Proof. See the appendix. 
As soon as b is suciently large that neither the scal nor the monetary
regime are equilibrium outcomes (b > 2), then the continuum of default-free
equilibria coexist with the equilibrium with default. This is the salient and
interesting dierence with the case of a convex cost studied in Proposition
1, in which default-free equilibria do not coexist with the cum-default equi-
librium in pure strategies. The intuition for this dierence can be found in
the strategic impact of the assumed xed cost. With a xed cost, the game
is no longer a \game of chicken." Fiscal and monetary accommodations are
no longer pure strategic substitutes as the xed cost induces strategic com-
plementarity. The cost of accommodation relative to the cost of default for
one authority decreases as the other authority accommodates more because
a smaller accommodating eort then suces to avoid the xed default cost.
This creates a coordination motive between F and M that generates the
additional multiplicity of equilibria|default-free versus cum-default.
One can show that as in Proposition 2, the introduction of small ex-
ogenous shocks to the policy variables reduces the number of equilibria.
There remain however multiple equilibria under uncertainty in this case of
a xed cost. Because of the above-mentioned coordination problem, there
still are two equilibria with varying probabilities of default in the limiting
case of vanishing uncertainty. Also, the setup with uncertainty still has the
unpalatable feature that default occurs even for small values of b.
A negative progress report. The analysis suggests that the simultane-
ous games considered thus far are tools of limited applicability to the study
of scal and monetary coordination. Without uncertainty, the number of
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equilibria is too large to generate useful predictions. The addition of un-
certainty prunes equilibria, but small sovereign defaults arise as a routine
tool in the remaining ones, contrary to the evidence that sovereign defaults
typically are of signicant magnitude. It is also at odds with the commonly
held view that default is a \nuclear option" that is not seriously considered
below very large debt levels. This motivates the restriction of the rest of the
paper to games of sequential moves.
2.5 Sequential moves
One natural way to overcome the issues facing simultaneous games is to
represent the interaction between F and M as a bargaining game with al-
ternative oers. The seminal innite-horizon setting of Rubinstein (1982)
is not suited to this application in which players face xed deadlines. We
rst study the simplest nite-horizon environment|ultimatum games|in
the xed-cost setup of Section 2.4. More precisely we assign payos (8) and
(9) to F and M and consider two games. Under scal lead, F makes a take-
it-or-leave-it oer to M , whereas the authorities swap roles under monetary
lead.
Proposition 4. (Fiscal versus monetary lead)
 Under scal lead, there is a unique equilibrium:8><>:
(F ; b=F ) if b 2 (F pM ; F (pM + M )],
(b=(pM + M ); pM + M ) if b 2 (F (pM + M )); (F + F )(pM + M )),
(F ; pM ) if b > (F + F )(pM + M ).
 Under monetary lead, there is a unique equilibrium:8><>:
(b=pM ; pM ) if b 2 (F pM ; (F + F )pM ],
(F + F ; b=(F + F )) if b 2 ((F + F )pM ; (F + F )(pM + M )),
(F ; pM ) if b > (F + F )(pM + M ).
Proof. The leader just picks the simultaneous-game equilibrium that
warrants him the highest payo. Under scal lead, as b increases, the equi-
librium is rst the scal regime, F then partially accommodates once M
accommodates so much that it is indierent with default, and nally the
public sector defaults. Monetary lead is the mirror image. 
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Figure 2. Equilibria under monetary and fiscal lead. 
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Path of equilibria as b 
increases under fiscal lead 
and a counter-offer 
Figure 2 illustrates how the equilibrium evolves with b under monetary and
scal lead as well as in the case of a counter-oer discussed below. It is
transparent that the analysis of such ultimatum games is very similar in
the case of a convex cost. The leader picks the most favorable equilibrium
among the pure-strategy equilibria of the game with simultaneous move.
Counter-oers. Suppose to x ideas that F moves rst but that M can
make a counter-oer which comes at a cost xM , where x 2 (0; 1).14 A
possible interpretation of this cost is that the monetary authority worries
nancial markets by dissenting with the scal one this way. It is straight-
forward to see that the equilibrium becomes:8>>>><>>>>:
(F ; b=F ) if b 2 (F pM ; F (pM + xM )],
(b=(pM + xM ); pM + xM ) if b 2 (F (pM + xM )); (F + F )(pM + xM )),
(F + F ; b=(F + F )) if b 2 ((F + F )(pM + xM )); (F + F )(pM + M )),
(F ; pM ) if b > (F + F )(pM + M ).
Whereas the identity of the authority that picks the residual bill switches
14The case x = 1 is identical to that of scal lead whereas x = 0 corresponds to monetary
lead.
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once from M to F as b increases in the ultimatum game, there is one ad-
ditional switch from F to M in the case of a counter-oer. Intuitively,
introducing further rounds of oers would induce more frequent switches,
and so the respective accommodating eorts of F and M would increase
more smoothly with b as the number of rounds increases.
Who has the bargaining power? Bargaining games eliminate the issues
of equilibrium indeterminacy or implausibility facing simultaneous games.
But this comes at the cost of making non-obvious assumptions regarding
the bargaining power of each authority. In other words, if one could derive
the objectives (8) and (9) of F and M|or a more sophisticated version of
them|out of a structural model of the economy, then one would still be left
with little empirical guidance as to the exact structure of bargaining. One
way to obtain some guidance is to tease out distinctive empirical implications
from various assumptions about bargaining power. We now show that a
dynamic version of this game with a richer debt structure delivers such
implications.
3 Dynamic game of chicken: Public liabilities as
commitment devices
This section studies dynamic versions of the simple games with sequential
moves and xed default costs studied in Section 2.5.15
3.1 Setup
Time is discrete and is indexed by t 2 N. At each date t, the scal authority
F sets a real primary surplus t 2 R and the monetary authority M a price
level pt > 0.
16
Endogenous public liabilities. In addition to setting their respective
policy instruments at each date, F and M can also promise nominal future
payments to a private sector comprised of competitive risk-neutral investors
15Section 2 shows that the equilibria of the sequential games are qualitatively similar
under convex and xed costs.
16There are at least two simple cashless environments in which the monetary authority
can set the price level at each date this way. In the cashless limit of the cash-in-advance
model set up in Cochrane (2005), it does so by supplying the appropriate amount of
intra-date money. In Hall and Reis (2017), it does so by promising an appropriate real
repayment on one-period reserves.
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who discount future consumption with a factor  2 (0; 1).17 The scal
authority F is free to trade any stream of xed promised repayments with
the private sector. All repayments promised by F at a given date are pari-
passu. The monetary authority M can purchase outstanding government
securities held by the private sector by issuing nominal claims with arbitrary
repayment schedules. We deem these liabilities issued by the central bank
\remunerated reserves". F and M make take-it-or-leave-it oers of prices
and quantities to the private sector.18
Central bank reserves are the fundamental unit of value in every modern
economy. A \default" on excess reserves is thus basically a currency reform.
Such radical reforms clearly exceed the scope of central banks' mandates. We
capture this in our setting by assuming that M nds any option preferable
to a default on remunerated reserves.
Assumption 1. (Reserves are non-defaultable) The monetary author-
ity M incurs an arbitrarily large disutility from defaulting on remunerated
reserves.
We suppose thatM receives an exogenous real income stream with date-1
present value  > 0. Central banks' income is in practice mainly comprised
of seignorage|our environment is cashless, however|and of return from
assets possibly purchased at distressed prices. For expositional simplicity,
we study rst the limiting case in which  # 0, and so this income has a
negligible eect on the primary surplus if paid out as a dividend to the
government. We address the case of a nite  in Section 3.4.
Payos. A course of actions by F consists in real surpluses (t)t0 and a
set of promises to date-t0 nominal repayments issued at date t, (bt;t0)t0>t 1.
The actions of M are symmetrically comprised of price levels (pt)t0 and a
set of date-t0 nominal repayments promised at date t, (rt;t0)t0>t 1. Promises
issued at date t =  1 represent exogenous liabilities inherited from an un-
modelled past (the counterpart of b in the static model of Section 2).
Let t denote an indicator function equal to 1 if and only if these courses
of actions imply default on government debt held by the private sector after
17We suppose that optimization by the private sector implies a transversality condition
e.g., it is comprised of an innitely lived representative agent.
18This rules out equilibrium multiplicity due to multiple self-justied prices in a Wal-
rasian bond market, as in Aguiar et al. (2013).
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date t.19 The respective date-t payos of F and M are then
V Ft =  
X
s0
s j t+s j  (1 + )Ft; (13)
VMt =  
X
s0
s j pt+s   pM j  (1 + )Mt; (14)
where F ; M ; pM > 0.
Three remarks are in order. First, the target of the scal authority is
normalized to zero in (13), and so it must accommodate to avoid default
as soon as the public sector inherits some strictly positive liabilities at date
0 (as soon as b 1;t  0 with a strict inequality for some t  0).20 Second,
the public sector incurs an immediate cost of default as soon as a path
involves future default on government debt held by the private sector no
matter how remote the date of this default. This reects that the cost of
default (nancial instability, exclusion from capital markets,...) materializes
as soon as the private sector understands that the public sector will break
a promise at some future date.21 Finally, the public sector discounts future
adjustements with the same factor  as that of the private sector.
Initial public nances. We assume that at the outset, the public sector
faces two identical exogenous government debt repayments b at dates 1 and
2. Formally, b 1;1 = b 1;2 = b > 0 and, for all t =2 f1; 2g, b 1;t = 0. There
are no initial outstanding reserves (r 1;t = 0 for all t  0). This simple
environment delivers all the important insights at a small analytical cost.
Unanticipated versus anticipated scal shock. We will study a version
of the game in which the exogenous liabilities b due at dates 1 and 2 are
unanticipated : F and M discover them at date 1. We will then study the
situation in which these liabilities are anticipated : F and M discover them
at the outset of date 0. The motivation is twofold. First, the unanticipated
version is a useful building block to solve for the anticipated one. Second,
each version of the game generates dierent insights that are clearer when
presented separately.
19Formally, t = 1 if and only if there exists a date t
0  t at which there is government
debt held by the public and the public sector fails to fully honor it (
P
i<t0 bi;t0 > 
0
tpt0 +P
j>t0(qt0;jpt0=pj)bt0;j , where qt0;j is the (real) date-t
0 price asked for a date-j unit claim).
20Assuming a strictly positive surplus target clutters the exposition without adding
insights.
21The factor (1 + ) applied to the cost of default of F and M is just a convenient
normalization.
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Strategic interactions. Generically, an equilibrium is a set of actions by
F and M such that each authority makes optimal decisions given correct
expectations about the other authority's actions and all trades are fair to
the private sector given correct expectations over future actions. We will
compare the equilibria from games corresponding to dierent assumptions
regarding order of moves and commitment.
Fiscal versus monetary lead. Under scal lead, at each date t, F sets t and
possibly issues bonds. Observing this,M sets pt and possibly issues reserves.
F andM swap these positions under monetary lead. We restrict the analysis
to these situations in which one authority has the entire bargaining power in
order to obtain clear insights into how bargaining power aects equilibrium
outcomes.
Commitment power. Under full commitment, F and M can commit to
any plan of future actions. Under limited commitment, they optimize at
each date, and so the Nash equilibria resulting from their interactions are
subgame perfect.
The following Section 3.2 rst studies the situation of unanticipated scal
shocks. Section 3.3 then tackles that in which the shocks are anticipated at
date 0. Section 3.4 discusses the results.
3.2 Unanticipated scal shocks
In this Section 3.2, the public sector discovers the outstanding liabilities
b 1;1 = b 1;2 = b at the outset of date 1. This implies that they played their
respective targets and did not issue claims at date 0. We rst characterize
the equilibrium when parties can commit to any future action plan, and
then we do so when they cannot.
3.2.1 Full commitment
We characterize in turn equilibria under monetary and scal lead.
Proposition 5. (Unanticipated shocks, full commitment, M leads)
1. If b  F pM then M announces pt = pM for all t, and the scal
authority raises a stream of surpluses with date-1 present value (1 +
)b=pM .
2. If F pM < b  F (pM + M ), then M announces p1 = p2 =
b=F , pt = pM for t > 2, and F raises surpluses with date-1 present
value (1 + )F .
18
3. Otherwise F and M default and play their target at each date.
Proof. See the appendix. 
Not surprisingly, the equilibrium is very similar to that in the static
game described in Proposition 4. In case 1., M forces F to bear all the
accommodation costs|this is the multiperiod equivalent of the monetary
regime dened in Section 2. In case 2., F raises the maximum surplus
(1 + )F|the one that makes it indierent with default|and M picks
up the residual accommodation by inating away b at dates 1 and 2. Finally,
there is a threshold for b beyond which the public sector defaults (case 3.).
There is an asymmetry between F and M because the solvency con-
straint b(1=p1 + =p2)  1 + 2 is linear in surpluses and strictly con-
vex in price levels. Thus M has a unique optimal strategy that consists
in setting the price level at the same level at dates 1 and 2 given that
b 1;1 = b 1;2 = b.22 On the other hand, F 's strategy is indeterminate.
Given its access to perfect bond markets and linear payo, all that matters
is the present value of the future surpluses that it commits to raise. Were
its payo (absent default) strictly concave in surpluses, F would obviously
smooth the surpluses by permanently raising its per-period surplus target.
Proposition 6. (Unanticipated shocks, full commitment, F leads)
1. If b  F (pM+M ) then F raises a stream of surpluses with date-1
present value (1+)b=(pM +M ), and M sets p1 = p2 = pM +M
and pt = pM for t =2 f1; 2g.
2. Otherwise F and M default and play their target at each date.
Proof. See the appendix. 
The scal authority imposes maximum accommodation on the monetary
authority and picks up any excess accommodation by raising surpluses (case
1.), unless b is so large that the public sector defaults (case 2.).
Note that, unlike under monetary lead, there is no pure scal regime
whereby F sticks to its target for small levels of b. It is an uninteresting
consequence of the normalization of the scal target to 0. F must obviously
deviate from this target so that the public sector makes any nominal repay-
ments at all. With a strictly positive surplus target, the pure scal regime
would prevail for suciently low values of b.
22More generally, if b 1;1 6= b 1;2, then optimal price-level setting byM implies (ignoring
the constraint pt  pM ) p2=p1 =
p
(b 1;2=b 1;1).
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3.2.2 Limited commitment
Again, we consider rst monetary then scal lead. For conciseness, Proposi-
tion 7 below describes the equilibrium provided  is suciently large holding
all parameters other than b xed.23
Proposition 7. (Unanticipated shocks, limited commitment, M leads)
1. If b  2F pM , then, as in the full-commitment case, M can imple-
ment the monetary regime pt = pM for all t.
2. If 2F pM < b  2F (pM + M ), then at date 1 F sets 1 = 0
and renances the date-1 liability with debt due at date 2. Afterwards,
it raises surpluses with date-2 present value (1 + )F , and so is
indierent between defaulting or not at date 2. Authority M sets p1 =
p2 = b=(
2F ) > pM and pt = pM otherwise.
3. Otherwise the public sector defaults.
Proof. See the appendix. 
Comparing cases 1. in Propositions 5 and 7 shows that the range of
values of b for which M can impose the monetary regime when moving rst
is strictly smaller absent commitment. The reason for this is as follows. Ab-
sent commitment, F 's optimal strategy is to kick the can down the road by
extending debt maturity so that all liabilities bunch at date 2. By making
the date-2 liabilities suciently large, it forces M to accommodate at date
2 because F would credibly default at this date otherwise. Anticipating
this, M starts accommodating at date 1 so as to optimally smooth price-
level increases given the strict concavity of the solvency constraint. In other
words, the model exhibits endogenous scal irresponsibility. All agents are
far-sighted and share the same discount factor, and yet strategic concerns
induce F to minimize date-1 scal consolidation by rolling over debt. This
forces high future ination, which the monetary authority mitigates by cre-
ating current ination. As a result, M starts accommodating at date 1
whereas F does not until date 2 even though M has the entire bargaining
power at each date. Finally, limited commitment also implies that default
occurs at lower debt levels (2F (pM + M ) < F (pM + M )) .
Proposition 8. (Unanticipated shocks, limited commitment, F leads)
23The exact condition on  is stated in the proof of Proposition 7, which also explains
how the results are modied for lower values of . All insights carry over.
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1. If b  b < F (pM + M ), then M sets p1 = pM + (1   2)M <
p2 = pM + (1 + )M , and pt = pM for t > 2. F raises a surplus
with date-1 present value b(1=p1 + =p2).
2. Otherwise the public sector defaults.
Proof. See the appendix. 
Proposition 8 highlights a fundamental asymmetry between M and F .
Whereas, as shown in Proposition 7, F can extend the maturity of govern-
ment debt so as to force monetary accommodation when M leads and lacks
commitment, M cannot do so when F leads. The reason is that creating
reserves in order to purchase government debt held by the public has no
impact on the repayment schedule of the government. Hence M cannot kick
the can down the road in order to force F to accommodate at lower debt
levels than it would like to.
Absent commitment, F cannot help imposing maximum monetary ac-
commodation at date 2. This is inecient because it implies that p1 must
be set strictly inferior to p2 so that M does not force default at date 1. This
inecient postponement of ination implies that the default threshold b is
strictly smaller than that under commitment.
Remark on the value of commitment. It is easy to see that the equi-
libria under full commitment described in Propositions 5 and 6 still obtain
under the weaker assumption that only the leader (M in Proposition 5 and
F in Proposition 6) can commit. This would however not be true if the
duration of the inherited liabilities, measured for example by b 1;2=b 1;1,
was suciently large. In this case, the follower could nd a given date-2
deviation from target preferable to default at date 1, but no longer so at
date 2 once it is no longer discounted by . The simplifying assumption
that b 1;1 = b 1;2 = b enabled us to abstract from this time-inconsistency
problem in this case of unanticipated shocks. The case of anticipated shocks
studied in the following section is precisely meant to study this time incon-
sistency between dates 0 and 1.
3.3 Anticipated scal shocks
Consider now the situation in which the public sector learns at the outset
of date 0 that it inherits b 1;1 = b 1;2 = b. The case in which parties can
fully commit is a straightforward adaptation of that of full commitment and
unanticipated shocks:
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Proposition 9. (Anticipated shocks, full commitment) Under full
commitment, the respective equilibria under monetary and scal lead are re-
spectively described by Proposition 5 and 6 up to the substitution of fM ;F g
with fM=;F =g.
Proof. See the appendix. 
Intuitively, under full commitment, date-0 actions are immaterial. The
schedule under which F collects surpluses is irrelevant, only their present
value matters, and so assuming 0 = 0 is without loss of generality. (This
is only true under full commitment as we shall see below). Regarding M ,
there are no liabilities at date 0 and thus no gains from setting p0 > pM .
The only dierence with the unanticipated case stems from the fact that at
date 0, F andM discount with  the date-1 present value of their respective
costs of accommodations, whereas the cost of default along the equilibrium
path is unchanged for them. Default is therefore relatively more costly than
accommodation to the public sector at date 0 when the scal shock is more
remote than at date 1. This induces time-inconsistency: F and M commit
to accommodating higher levels of debt at date 0 than at date 1.
We are now equipped to solve for equilibria when the shock is antici-
pated and the public sector cannot commit beyond the current date. We
view this case as the most empirically relevant one. First, an unexpected
increase in future expenditures seems more realistic than a completely un-
foreseen large and current liquidity need. Second, a period in our model is a
time interval over which the eects of a given scal or/and monetary policy
fully materialize, and therefore corresponds reasonably well to a political or
central-bank term beyond which it is dicult to credibly commit. We study
in turn monetary and scal leads in this context.
Proposition 10. (Anticipated shocks, limited commitment, M leads)
1. If b  2F (pM + M ) then the equilibrium is as in the case of an
unanticipated shock described in Proposition 7.
2. If 2F (pM + M ) < b  F (pM + M ) then F prepays at date 0
shares of b 1;1 and b 1;2, each with face value b 2F (pM+M ). M
is inactive at date 0. The equilibrium at subsequent dates is described
in Proposition 7 in the case b = 2F (pM + M ).
3. If F (pM +M ) < b  F (pM +M ) then M issues reserves at date
0 in order to purchase date-t outstanding public debt for t 2 f1; 2g up
to a face value equal to (b=F   M )=(1 + ) at each date. M sets
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p1 = p2 = b=F and pt = pM for t =2 f1; 2g. F raises surpluses8><>:
0 = (1 + )(1  2)F ;
2 = (1 + )F ;
t = 0 for t =2 f0; 2g:
(15)
4. Otherwise F and M default and play their target at each date.
Proof. See the appendix. 
These results come from the time-inconsistency problem induced by the
fact that default along the equilibrium path comes at the same current cost
no matter how remote it is. This implies that the only dierence between the
unanticipated and anticipated cases is that the public sector is more willing
to avert default at date 0 than at date 1. If b is suciently small that the
public sector does not default in the unanticipated case (case 1.), then the
date-0 anticipation of the shock is immaterial. Beyond this threshold, F
and M can use date-0 actions to commit to more accommodation than they
would nd ex-post optimal. F can commit by buying back some of the
outstanding debt. M can commit to more ination than it would nd ex-
post optimal with the creation of reserves backed by public debt which would
threaten its solvency in case of sovereign default. We detail the mechanism
through which such open-market operations serve as a commitment to future
ination in Section 3.4.
As in the static case (or in the case of full commitment), the leader
M accommodates at date 0|that is, issues reserves to commit to future
ination|only if b is such that F has accommodated as much as possible
and is indierent with default (case 3.). Before this, F is the only date-0
mover and bears the entire burden of accommodation by buying back debt.
Finally, Proposition 11 studies the case of scal lead. For brevity we
state it assuming (1 + )  1|arguably the most plausible case, and
discuss below how (1 + ) < 1 (slightly) aects the results.
Proposition 11. (Anticipated shocks, limited commitment, F leads)
1. If b  b then the equilibrium is as in the case of an unanticipated shock
described in Proposition 8.
2. If b < b  b then F is inactive at date 0 and subsequently sets surpluses
with date-1 present value (1 + )F . At date 0, M issues reserves
to purchase part of the publicly held debt due at date 1. It then sets
p1 2 (pM + (1  2)M ; pM + (1 + )M ), p2 = pM + (1 + )M ,
and pt = pM for t =2 f1; 2g.
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3. If b < b  F (pM + M ), F prepays at date 0 a fraction 1   b=b of
dates 1 and 2 liabilities, and then the equilibrium is as in 2. for b = b.
4. Otherwise F and M default and play their target at each date.
Proof. See the appendix. 
Again, if b is suciently small that the public sector would not default
in the unanticipated case, then anticipation plays no role. Otherwise, the
follower M is the only accommodating party at date 0 until its commitment
to future ination makes it indierent with default. F then picks up the
residual accommodation need up to the point at which the public sector
nds default ex-ante optimal.
If, as assumed in Proposition 11, (1 + )  1, then M reaches date-0
indierence with default before the value of p1 that it commits to reaches
p2. For smaller values of , an additional region of b arises between cases 2.
and 3., whereby M uses reserves to commit to higher values of both p1 and
p2, with p1 = p2.
In sum, Propositions 10 and 11 show that debt prepayment and remu-
nerated reserves are commitment devices that enable the public sector to
accommodate a scal shock as long as it nds it optimal to do so under full
commitment (b  F (pM + M ) from Proposition 9) provided the shock is
anticipated. Whether F and M can commit or not aects how they share
the accommodation eort, however.
Summary of the main ndings. This multiperiod analysis sheds light
on two distinct implications from limited commitment. A rst implica-
tion is purely due to the multiplicity of public-debt installments. A second
implication stems instead from the time-inconsistency induced by a path-
independent cost of default.
This latter implication is muted when the scal shock is unanticipated.
In this case, under monetary lead, F can force M to accommodate more
when commitment is more limited. Authority F does so by rolling over
shorter-term government liabilities until they bunch with the longer-term
ones, thereby creating a cumulated amount of public debt that F cannot be
asked to mop up with scal surpluses only. Conversely (and unsurprisingly),
lack of commitment hurts F when it leads, because it cannot help imposing
that M inate as much as possible at remote dates. Authority F therefore
has no choice but inducing less ination at shorter horizons. This failure
to enable M to smooth debt monetization implies a higher ex-ante scal
burden.
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Assuming then that the scal shock is anticipated as of date 0 brings
in the second commitment problem due to a path-independent cost of de-
fault.24 Both F and M can in this case avail themselves of devices enabling
them to accommodate more than they nd ex-post optimal. The scal au-
thority simply buys back some debt so that its long-term liabilities remain
below the level at which its future behavior is ex-ante inecient. The mon-
etary authority swaps some public debt with remunerated reserves with the
private sector as a credible commitment to ex-post excessive future ina-
tion. As b increases, both authorities are rst passive at date 0. The leading
authority then remains passive but forces the follower to apply its respective
commitment device at date 0, up to the point at which the follower is in-
dierent with default. Beyond this point the leader also commits to future
accommodation.
So, who has the bargaining power since 2008? A natural empirical
counterpart of the exogenous liabilities b that the public sector inherits in
our model are the public liabilities that resulted from the bailout of many
private agents during the 2008 crisis, and from the subsequent attempts at
getting the economy out of a liquidity trap. The Federal Reserve largely
contributed to the eort of the public sector with a massive creation of re-
munerated reserves. This can occur under two circumstances in our setup.
Under monetary lead, this occurs when the scal authority has applied max-
imum scal discipline, to the point that it is indierent with default (Propo-
sition 10, case 3.). Under scal lead, this may occur even before the scal
authority attempts at any early scal consolidation (Proposition 11, case
2.). We believe that the assumption of scal lead ts the response to the
2008 crisis much better than that of monetary lead for two reasons. First,
the realized and projected primary federal decits since 2008 are hardly con-
sistent with maximum scal consolidation. In fact, comparing data prior to
2000 with post-2008 decits, Hall (2013) argues that scal policy has se-
riously departed from the objective of stabilizing the debt to GDP ratio.
To be sure, a standard scal-multiplier argument which is absent from our
model can rationalize the presence of decits during the post-2008 recession
years|until 2011-12, say. It seems however more challenging to explain per-
sistent realized and projected decits since 2008 with such a scal-multiplier
argument. Second, under monetary lead, M optimally sets a high price level
as soon as of date 1 and then maintains the same level at date 2: Ination
24In fact, this second time-consistency problem arises in the even simpler environment
of a single future payment (b 1;t = 0 for all t 6= 1 and b 1;1 > 0) as the multiplicity of
installments is irrelevant for it.
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occurs early at date 1 and the price level is then stable. On the other hand
ination arises in a more protracted fashion under scal lead, with the bulk
of debt monetization taking place \in the long run" (at date 2). This is eas-
ier to reconcile with the absence of signicant realized or expected ination
thus far since 2008.
3.4 Discussion
Inspecting the mechanism through whichM purchases long-term public debt
through open-market operations so as to commit to future ination is in-
structive. Consider for example situations 2. or 3. in Proposition 11, in
which M needs to commit to a date-1 price level p1 strictly above the value
pM + (1   2)M above which it would rather default ex post. Suppose
M issues reserves with a face value r < b due at date 1. In the (out-of-
equilibrium) event that F fully defaults at date 1, M is forced to avoid
default on reserves by setting the date-1 price level above the level pd1 such
that
pd1 = r: (16)
This means that along the equilibrium path in which public debt is fully
honored, F can extract a maximum price level p1 such that
p1 + p2 = (1 + )M + p
d
1 + pM : (17)
Condition (17) states that M is indierent between defaulting or not along
the default-free equilibrium path, understanding that the date-1 price will
have to be at least pd1 in case of sovereign default. Injecting the value of p2
from Proposition 11 and that of pd1 from (16) yields
p1 = pM + (1  2)M + r

: (18)
Expression (18) yields the amount of reserves r that M must issue at date
0 in order to credibly commit to p1 > pM + (1  2)M .
Relevance of QE. Reis (2017) notes that open-market operations such
as the one that we consider are not immaterial if there is a probability of
default on government debt in equilibrium whereas remunerated reserves are
risk-free. Our strategic approach yields the stronger result that open-market
operations, by swapping two securities that are, along the equilibrium path,
risk-free and thus perfect substitutes, also has an impact on future price levels
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because the out-of-equilibrium possibility of default aects future strategic
interactions. This derivation yields four other interesting insights that we
discuss in turn.
3.4.1 Finite  and dividend policy
The central bank's dividend policy is immaterial in the limiting case of an
arbitrarily small  studied thus far. The analysis is straightforward when 
is nite. Expression (18) shows that the face value of reserves, r, which is
necessary to induce a given date-1 price p1 increases with . Thus r may
exceed b for  suciently large in principle, thereby violating our restriction
to open-market operations in which public debt and reserves are swapped
at fair value. The central bank can easily overcome this by paying out a
dividend to the government at date 0, and retaining only a suciently small
fraction of its income.25 This retained fraction can in fact be arbitrarily
small as we assumed: All that matters in our environment is that M 's net
wealth is strictly positive at date 1.
3.4.2 Helicopter money
We focus thus far on open-market operations: The creation of reserves only
serves to buy outstanding public debt at the prevailing market price. This
is a realistic but arbitrary restriction on M 's action set. M could create
reserves and directly pay out the proceeds to F at date 0 in order to commit
to future ination|a mechanism deemed \helicopter money". In this situ-
ation, reserves are backed only by M 's income  whether F defaults on its
obligations or not, and so condition (16) implies thatM commits to ination
r= by issuing reserves of size r.26
The reserves of M are completely unbacked by future taxes along the
equilibrium path in the case of helicopter money whereas it is only an out-
of-equilibrium threat in the case of open-market operations. Yet the same
given quantity r of reserves yields the same commitment to future ination
under open-market-operations as with helicopter money. This implausible
result obviously owes to the assumption of purely xed costs of sovereign
default, which implies in turn that F can credibly threaten with default on
100% of outstanding government debt. Suppose conversely that F cannot
25This may lead to a negative date-0 book value of the central bank's equity if this
future income is not booked at fair value.
26Authority F may either rebate the payment from M to the private sector or buy back
debt. Only the latter benets M .
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credibly threaten M with a default larger than a haircut h 2 (0; 1] on its
liabilities. This does not aect the impact of reserves r on the date-1 price
in the case of helicopter money since the reserves are fully unbacked anyway.
On the other hand, with standard open-market, condition (16) becomes
pd1+ r(1  h) = r; (19)
and so the date-1 price level induced by reserves r is equal to pM + (1  
2)M + rh= in the case of open-market operations, whereas it is still
pM + (1   2)M + r= with helicopter money. The latter is above the
former as soon as h < 1.
Notice nally that holding  xed, the amount of reserves r needed to
reach a given commitment level becomes arbitrarily large as h! 0.
3.4.3 Strong credibility and politically-insensitive assets
The contrapositive of the result that a highly leveraged central bank can
credibly commit to high future ination is that ination targeting is more
credible ex-ante if the central bank is suciently wealthy in all future states
of nature, so that it is insensitive to the (out-of-equilibrium) threat of insol-
vency resulting from an (out-of-equilibrium) scal crisis. One way to achieve
this is to augment the central bank's mandate with a covenant imposing
that it is endowed with an amount of \politically-insensitive" assets that
increases in the total liabilities of the public sector|not only the liabilities
that are in the bank's balance sheet at a given date. Politically-insensitive
assets include gold or foreign assets. In our elementary setup this means
committing to an  always suciently large that debt monetization is never
credible.
3.4.4 What if abandoning the currency is also very costly to the
scal authority?
Finally, we replace Assumption 1 with
Assumption 2. F and M both incur an arbitrarily large disutility from a
default on remunerated reserves.
It seems reasonable to consider the possibility that the government at
large incurs large political costs from a currency reform induced by a scal
crisis. It is easy to see that the analysis is verbatim under scal lead: Propo-
sitions 6, 8, and 11 are unchanged. Basically the cost to F from default on
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reserves are immaterial as F , when it leads, never needs to accommodate
when reserves are at risk.
Conversely, Assumption 2 gives exorbitant power to M under monetary
lead. Suppose that M wants to induce a payment  from F at date t while
staying on target pM . Authority M can simply for example issue unbacked
reserves due at date t, rt, such that
pM (t + ) = rt; (20)
where t is the date-t market value of M 's net wealth. This strong ability of
the monetary authority to induce scal discipline seems highly unrealistic.
This casts further doubt on the plausibility of the assumption that M has
a very strong bargaining power (M leads).
4 Conclusion
This paper applies non-cooperative game theory to the study of the inter-
action between scal and monetary policy. We derive the implications from
a wide array of assumptions regarding payos, timing, and commitment
power. We conclude that the model in which the scal authority has signif-
icant bargaining power and the public sector cannot indenitely commit is
the one that delivers the most plausible predictions. We are admittedly only
scratching the surface here. There are at least three interesting avenues for
future research.
First, the obvious drawback from assuming reduced-form payos as we
do is that it precludes substantial normative analysis. An interesting re-
search route thus consists in taking a stand on the determinants of the
policy targets and on the costs of sovereign default. This would connect
equilibrium outcomes to the deep parameters of the economy, thereby open-
ing up the opportunity to address a number of normative questions. One
can in particular interpret the payo of the central bank as resulting from a
mandate that could be optimally designed. As discussed in Section 3.4, our
approach suggests that the actions of the government as shareholder of the
central bank have important strategic implications, and so the capitaliza-
tion of the central bank should be regulated by the mandate ex-ante rather
than being mostly left to ex-post negotiations, as is by and large currently
the case. Such a micro-founded model could also inform the debate on the
opportunity to put the central bank in charge of nancial stability and bank-
ing supervision, as the bank in this case presumably puts more weight on
sovereign default, and this deeply aects its whole equilibrium policies.
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Second, we could extend the game to more players along the lines of
Aguiar et al. (2015) or Sargent (1986). The \scal" authority could explic-
itly feature executive and legislative branches, and local tax authorities. The
lack of cooperation and coordination across these branches could in partic-
ular be an endogenous source of commitment power vis-a-vis the monetary
authority.
Third, uncertainty is an important feature of the long-term dynamics of
public nances that we study, and so departing from perfect foresight is in
order. One particularly interesting source of uncertainty regards the \types"
of the politicians and central bankers that will be making future decisions|
taking into account that politicians are elected and appoint central bankers.
The theory of games under incomplete information could in addition be
applied to the case in which decision makers privately observe their types
and try to signal it to their counterparts and to the private sector.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1: Equilibria are either all default-free or all feature default.
If a strategy prole (; p) constitutes an equilibrium then it must be that
b  p otherwise at least one player could strictly benet from getting closer
to target. If b = p then it must be that
g0F (   F )  f 0F (0); (21)
g0M (p  pM ) 
b
p2
f 0M (0): (22)
If either inequality is not satised, the associated player could benet from
getting closer to target. Conversely if b > p then none of these inequalities
holds, otherwise the associated player would benet from accommodating
more.
Suppose b  MpF and consider an equilibrium (; p). If  > M then
p  pF and b=p2  =p > M=p, and so (21) is not satised whereas (22)
is, a contradiction. Thus   M and any equilibrium must be such that
b = p. If b > MpF , then an equilibrium cannot be such that b = p
otherwise (21) and (22) would imply b  MpF .
Step 2: Default-free equilibria. Suppose b  MpF . Dene
(b) = inf

 2 [F ; M ] j b

g0M

b

  pM

 f 0M (0)

; (23)
b1 = supfb  F pM j (b) = F g; (24)
b2 = MpM ; (25)
b  = inffb1; b2g; (26)
b+ = supfb1; b2g: (27)
A prole (; p) is an equilibrium if and only if   F , p  pM , p = b, and
(; p) satises (21) and (22). The equilibria are therefore exactly (; b=) for
 2 [(b); inffb=pM ; Mg], and so they can be described as in the proposition.
Step 3: Equilibrium with default. Suppose b > MpF . For d > 0, the
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conditions
g0F (   F ) = f 0F (d); (28)
g0M (p  pM ) =
b
p2
f 0M (d) (29)
implicitly dene (d) and p(d; b) as strictly increasing functions. Further-
more, b=p(d; b) is strictly increasing in b. Since d(; p; b) = b=p   is strictly
decreasing in p and  ,
d =
b
p(d; b)
  (d) (30)
admits a unique solution d for b xed. This solution characterizes the unique
equilibrium. Finally, the comparative statics with respect to b are a straight-
forward consequence from the fact b=p(d; b) is strictly increasing in b holding
d xed.
Proof of Proposition 2
The payos E[UX(; p)] for X 2 fF ;Mg are strictly concave, bounded
above, and dierentiable and so (; p) is a Nash equilibrium if and only
if
@E[UF (; p)]
@
=
@E[UM (; p)]
@p
= 0: (31)
A similar reasoning to that in Step 3 in the proof of Proposition 1 shows
that this system has a unique solution (; p).
Consider now (; p) such that p < b. Then
lim
!0
@E[UF (; p)]
@
=  g0F (   F ) + f 0F

b
p
  

; (32)
lim
!0
@E[UM (; p)]
@p
=  g0M (p  pM ) +
b
p2
f 0M

b
p
  

: (33)
If (; p) are such that b = ekp for k > 0, then
lim
!0
@E[UF (; p)]
@
=  g0F (   F ) + P (F + M < k)f 0F (0) ; (34)
lim
!0
@E[UM (; p)]
@p
=  g0M (p  pM ) + P (F + M < k)
b
p2
f 0M (0) : (35)
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Continuity then implies that if b > MpF , the unique equilibrium converges
to that in the case without uncertainty when  ! 0. Otherwise it converges
to the unique solution to
b = p; (36)
pg0M (p  pM )f 0F (0) = g0F (   F )f 0M (0) : (37)
The probability of default is strictly positive, increasing from 0 to 1 as b
spans (F pM ; MpF ].
Proof of Proposition 3
Given the xed default cost, a strategy prole (; p) is an equilibrium if
and only if either p = b or (; p) = (F ; pM ). Default-free equilibria thus
correspond to the portion of the hyperbolae p = b in the plane (; p) that is
within the rectangle [F ; F +F ] [pM ; pM+M ]. Default is an equilibrium
outcome if and only if b  F (pM + M ) and b  (F + F )pM , otherwise
one authority always nds accommodation preferable to default.
Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose M plays pt = pM for all t  1. Default grants F a payo  (1 +
)F . F may instead accommodate, which it can do in innitely many
ways as long as the stream of surpluses that it raises has date-1 present
value (1+)b=pM . Therefore, as long as b  F pM , M optimally commits
to the prole pt = pM for all t  1 and F accommodates.
If b > F pM , then M can avoid default with any strategy such that
pt = pM for t  3 and b=p1+b=p2  (1+)F . Setting p1 = p2 = b=(F )
maximizes its payo over these strategies, and so M plays this as long as
VM1 =  (1 + )(b=(F )  pM )   (1 + )M , or b  F (pM + M ).
The public sector defaults otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose rst that F not only raises surpluses and issues debt, but also sets
p1 and p2 subject to p1 + p2  (1 + )(pM + M ). In this case, the
best strategy that does not involve default consists in minimizing the real
burden of debt b=p1+ b=p2 by setting p1 = p2 = pM + M , and in raising
matching surpluses with date-1 present value (1+ )b=(pM + M ). This is
preferable to default if and only if b  F (pM + M ).
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For such values of b, F can indeed induce M to set p1 = p2 = pM +M
by announcing any strategy such that the public sector is exactly solvent
with such prices p1 and p2 (and pt = pM for t  3). Authority F can for
example set 1 = 2 = b=(pM + M ), bt;t0 = 0 for all t
0 > t  1. The
monetary authority then nds it optimal to accommodate with p1 = p2 =
pM + M .
Proof of Proposition 7
We derive the equilibrium by backward induction.
Suppose that the public sector has to repay b0 at date 2. From Proposi-
tion 4, M chooses p2 = pM as long as F can bear the accommodation cost
(b0  (1+)F pM ). For b0 2 [(1+)F pM ; (1+)F (pM+(1+)M )],
M forces F to accommodate as much as possible (2 = (1 + )F ) and
M deviates from target (p2 = b
0=((1 + )F )). For larger values of b0, the
public sector defaults.
We now consider the problem from the date-1 perspective. Suppose M
has played and p1 is xed. Authority F optimally seeks to maximize p2
in order to minimize the real debt burden. From the date-2 analysis, p2 is
weakly increasing in b0, and b0 = b+ p2(b=p1   1)= is in turn increasing in
p2 and decreasing in 1. We now prove a series of auxiliary results.
Result 1. Authority M can set p1 = p2 = pM if and only if b  2F pM .
Proof. If b  2F pM , then b0=p2  b=pM + b=(pM )  (1+)F , and so
from the date-2 analysisM can set p1 = p2 = pM . Conversely if b > 
2F pM
then if M sets p1 = pM , F sets 1 = 0 and rolls over date-1 debt so that
b0 = b+ p2b=(pM ) > (1 + )F , implying that M must accommodate at
date 2. 
Result 2. If b > 2F pM , then 2 = (1 + )F in equilibrium.
Proof. If 2 < (1 + )F , then it must be that p2 = pM otherwise M
would induce a higher 2 with a lower price level p2. From Result 1, it must
then be that p1 > pM . Furthermore, it must be that
b0 + 1pM=  (1 + )F pM ; (38)
otherwise F could force p2 > pM at date 2 by reducing 1. If inequality (38)
is strict then M can reduce p1. If (38) binds, F can still strictly benet by
reducing p1 and increasing p2, a contradiction. 
Result 3. If b > 2F pM , then if an equilibrium is such that 1 > 0 it is
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also such that p2 = pM + (1 + )M .
Proof. From Result 2, 2 = (1 + )F . So if p2 < pM + (1 + )M , F
can reduce 1 to increase b
0 thereby forcing M to raise p2 unless 1 = 0. 
Suppose b > 2F pM . These results imply that ifM seeks to implement
an equilibrium such that p1 = p2 (\smoothing strategy") then it must be
such that 1 = 0, 2 = (1 + )F , and so p1 = p2 = b=(
2F ). Such a
smoothing strategy grants M a payo (viewed from date 1)
(1 + )

b
2F
  pM

; (39)
and is thus feasible as long as b  2F (pM + M ).
Alternatively, ifM prefers to induce 1 > 0 (\extracting strategy"), then
it must sacrice ination smoothing by setting p1 < p2 = (1 + )M . For
a given b the date-1 price level p1(b) solves in this case
b
p1(b)
+
b
pM + (1 + )M
= (1 + )F ; (40)
or p1(b) = pM if (40) admits no solution larger than pM . This extracting
strategy can be sustained up to the point at which p1(b) = pM+(1 2)M
at which M is indierent with default. This denes an upper bound b for
the values of b such that the extracting strategy is admissible that solves
b =
F [pM + (1 + )M ][pM + (1  2)M ]
pM + [1 + (1  )]M : (41)
The smoothing strategy is clearly dominant for b in a right neighbor-
hood of 2F pM as it converges to the commitment solution whereas the
extracting one does not. Furthermore, straightforward computations show
that b  2F (pM +M ) for  suciently close to 1. This implies that the
smoothing strategy always dominates the extracting one in this case, and
establishes the proposition.
For lower values of , b > 2F (pM +M ). This implies that the equi-
librium features an additional region b 2 (2F (pM + M ); b) that stands
between the smoothing-strategy region and the default region in which M
implements the extracting strategy.
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Proof of Proposition 8
Authority F ex-post optimally imposes full accommodation by M at date
2 unless the public sector defaults, and so p2 = pM + (1 + )M in the
absence of default. This implies that at date 1, F forcesM to the maximum
feasible accommodation given date-2 actions. The constraint (p1   pM ) +
(p2   pM )  (1 + )M implies p1 = pM + (1   2)M in the absence
of default. Authority F then raises a stream of surplus with date-1 present
value b(1=p1+=p2) as long as this accommodation cost is lower than (1+
)F , and otherwise the public sector defaults. The default cuto is b
dened in (41).
Proof of Proposition 9
Under commitment, there is nothing relevant that either authority can do
at date 0 that it cannot do later on. Setting p0 > pM is useless because
there is no outstanding public debt at date 0, and the timing of surpluses
is immaterial. Furthermore, the scaling of defaults costs by 1= stems from
the assumption that F and M incur these costs immediately given a non-
sustainable path for public nances, as formalized in (13) and (14).
Proof of Proposition 10
Suppose rst that b  2F (pM + M ). For such values of b, Proposition 7
shows that there is no default and characterizes the equilibrium in the case
of an unanticipated scal shock and limited commitment. There is nothing
that either party can do at date 0 that would improve its situation over this
unanticipated case. First, as is shown below, issuing reserves can only lead
M to set higher future price levels than in the absence of reserves. Second,
pre-paying debt by raising 0 > 0 would also be costly to F as it would
enable M to reduce p1 and p2. The equilibrium is therefore as described in
Proposition 7.
Consider then the case b 2 (2F (pM+M ); F (pM+M )]. For such
values of b, Proposition 7 shows that there is default in the absence of com-
mitment if the shocks are unanticipated, whereas Proposition 9 shows that
the equilibrium under commitment does not feature default when shocks are
anticipated as of date 0. In this case, M can let F bear the brunt of ex-ante
accommodation by being inactive at date 0. The scal authority then opti-
mally prepays the minimum amount of future debt at date 0 so as to elicit
maximum accommodation by M at dates 1 and 2 (p1 = p2 = pM + M ).
This implies reducing future outstanding liabilities at dates 1 and 2 from b to
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2F (pM+M ). This requires raising 0 = (1+)[b=(pM+M ) 2F ].
Given that F also raises 2 = (1 + )F , it is willing to bear all the brunt
of ex-ante accommodation this way as long as
0 + 
22  (1 + )F ; (42)
or
b  F (pM + M ): (43)
If b 2 (F (pM + M ); F (pM + M )], then again the public sector
defaults in the absence of commitment if the scal shock is unanticipated
(Proposition 7) whereas it prefers to make good under commitment if it
anticipates the shock at date 0 (Proposition 9). The ex-ante accommodation
eort of F described in the previous case is no longer sucient, however, and
so M must also contribute by committing to price levels p1 and p2 such that
(1 + )F  (b=p1 + b=p2). It does so at the lowest cost by committing
to p1 = p2 = b=F .
We now show that M can commit to such future price levels by issuing
remunerated reserves. Suppose M issues reserves such that r0;1 = r0;2 = r.
In case of sovereign default at date 1, M must set pd1 at date 1 and p
d
2 at
date 2 such that
r
pd1
+
r
pd2
 ; (44)
where  is the date-1 present value of its (real) income. Authority M max-
imizes its payo by doing so with pd1 = p
d
2 = (1 + )r=. This implies that
M is at date 1 indierent between any prices p1 and p2 that avert default
and defaulting if and only if
p1 + p2 = (1 + )M + p
d
1 + p
d
2; (45)
and so p1 = p2 = b=F is feasible for r = (b=F   M )=(1 + ).
Finally, if b > F (pM + M ), then the public sector defaults as it does
under full commitment.
Proof of Proposition 11
The proof mirrors that of Proposition 10 and we only sketch it.
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First, if b  b, where b is dened in (41), then F and M do not de-
fault when the scal shock is unanticipated. For the same reasons as when
M leads, they both are inactive at date 0 and then play the equilibrium
described in Proposition 8.
Second, there exists b > b dened below such that for b 2 (b; b], F
remains inactive at date 0 but induces M to commit to higher price levels
than it nds ex-post optimal so that the public sector does not default. The
dierence with the situation in which M leads is that p1 < p2 ex-post, and
so M only raises p1 to a level p1(b) such that
b
p1(b)
+
b
pM + (1 + )M
= (1 + )F : (46)
The threshold b is implicitly dened as
p1(b)  pM + 2(1 + )M = (1 + )M : (47)
Note that (1 + )  1 ensures that p1(b) < pM + (1 + )M and so M
never fully smoothes ination. In order to commit to the price level p1(b),
M issues a date-1 reserve r = [p1(b)   (pM + (1   2)M )]. This way it
commits to a date-1 price level in case of default pd1 such that p
d
1 = r. This
means that along the equilibrium path in which public debt is fully honored,
F can extract a maximum price level p1 such that
p1 + p2 = (1 + )M + p
d
1 + pM ; (48)
or
p1 = pM + (1  2)M + r

= p1(b): (49)
For b 2 (b; F (pM + M )], F must also accommodate at date 0. It does
so by prepaying a (nominal) amount b   b of public debt at each date 1,2
and then lets M accommodate as above for b = b.
Otherwise the public sector defaults.
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